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I. INTRODUCTION
An unavoidable tension exists between protecting mentally re-
tarded minors' from unwanted or unnecessary sterilization 2 and al-
* The author would like to thank Tim Shaw, Randy Brown, and the staff at Ne-
braska Advocacy Services for bringing this and other important issues to light
and providing background information.
1. The American Association on Mental Deficiency has defined mental retardation
as "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concur-
rently with deficits in adaptive behavior, and manifested during the developmen-
tal period". H. J. Grossman (Ed.), Manual on Terminology and Classification in
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lowing them to choose sterilization as a means of contraception.
Despite this tension, several states have determined how the choice to
sterilize a mentally retarded minor should be made, if at all. However,
Nebraska has failed to make this determination, either judicially or
legislatively. Without legal guidelines, several important questions
are left unanswered in Nebraska: who can authorize the sterilization
of a mentally retarded minor; whether consent of the mentally re-
tarded minor is necessary to perform the sterilization; what procedure
is to be followed if consent is not possible; whether a judge is liable for
ordering the sterilization; and for whose benefit the sterilization is be-
ing performed.
These questions illustrate the scope of the problem that a void in
state law has created.3 At stake are fundamental constitutional
rights4 6f a class of citizens whose history is that of vulnerability.5 Be-
cause o the nature of mental retardation, affected persons may not be
capable of making procreative decisions.6 As a result, they are unable
to exercise their constitutional right to choose sterilization as a contra-
ceptive measure or resist others making the sterilization decision for
them. ±he lack of a decisionmaking structure presents both ethical
and legal dilemmas for all involved in the sterilization decision for a
mentally retarded minor.7
Several issues are involved in determining whether or not a men-
tally retarded minor should be sterilized. It should go without saying
that any mentally retarded minor competent to make decisions should
Mental Retardation, Special Publication Series No. 2, 11+, Washington, D.C.
(Rev. ed. 1973).
2. Sterilization is the process by which an individual is rendered incapable of procre-
ation. In females, the most common methods are tying the fallopian tubes and
hysterectomy. In males, vasectomy is the only proven method. BLACK's LAW DIc-
TIONARY 1268 (5th ed. 1979).
3. One federal safeguard is the Department of Health and Human Services regula-
tions which prohibit the use of federal money, including Medicaid, to fund sterili-
zation for any minor, institutionalized individual, or person declared incompetent
by a court. 42 C.F.R. §§ 50.203, 50.206 (1988).
4. See infra notes 9-26 and accompanying text.
5. Although not reaching the status of "suspect class," it has been argued that both
minors and the mentally retarded deserve such a status because of their respec-
tive histories. The argument that the mentally retarded should be considered a
"suspect class" was recently unsuccessfully advanced in City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). In the opinion, the Supreme Court
reiterated its position that heightened review should not be extended to claims of
differential treatment based on age. Id.
6. A common myth is that mental retardation renders persons incapable of making
legal decisions of any kind.
7. Although this Comment focuses on minors, the discussion is equally applicable to
mentally retarded adults. However, the problem is more acute with minors be-
cause, as a class, they are often seen as less competent. Thus, they are seen as
"doubly incompetent," based on both their minor and mentally retarded status.
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be allowed to make those decisions.8 The individual's decision may
encompass not only procreative considerations, but also interests in
maintaining harmony and stability in family relationships. For those
minors found incompetent to make decisions, competing interests
must be balanced. Sterilization can be beneficial because it provides
contraception to someone unable or unwilling to use other methods.
However, the power to sterilize can be misused as punishment, to
solve hygiene problems associated with menstruation, or to make a
decision that the mentally impaired individual is in fact qualified to
make. Without a legal structure, the means for balancing competing
interests are absent.
This Comment first provides a brief analysis of the Supreme Court
cases recognizing procreative rights. Following that overview is a dis-
cussion of how these rights have been interpreted to apply to mentally
retarded minors. This Comment then reviews the diverse judicial re-
sponses to the question of sterilization. An historical analysis is
presented with special emphasis on issues of jurisdiction, liability, and
the procedures courts have adopted to safeguard the procreative rights
of mentally retarded minors. This Comment reviews state legislation
regulating the sterilization of mentally retarded minors, and con-
cludes with an analysis of the current state of law in Nebraska with
some recommendations.
II. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY RETARDED
MINORS TO MAKE PROCREATIVE CHOICES
The Supreme Court has often ruled on cases involving the funda-
mental right of procreative choice. In Skinner v. Oklahoma,9 the
Court ruled that a state statute which required the involuntary sterili-
zation of convicted larcenists, but not of convicted embezzlers, violated
the equal protection clause.1O Writing for the majority, Justice Doug-
las recognized a fundamental right of procreation: "We are dealing
here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of
man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race. The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have
subtle, far reaching and devastating effects.""
The Supreme Court has since reaffirmed the fundamental nature
8. Because the severity of mental retardation generally affects competent decision-
making and most people diagnosed with mental retardation are only "mildly"
retarded, there should be a presumption of competence. Similarly, there is evi-
dence to suggest that minors are competent to consent in a wide variety of legal
contexts. See G. MELTON, G. KOOCHER & M. SAKS, CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO
CONSENT (1982).
9. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
10. Id. at 538.
11. Id. at 541.
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of the right to procreate in the related contexts of contraception and
abortion.12 These cases deal primarily with minors. Thus far, the
Supreme Court has tackled issues of procreative choice for minors in a
case involving the purchase of contraceptives, 13 and in a series of cases
involving abortion legislation.14 These decisions turn primarily on an
analysis of the right to privacy.
The right to privacy was first recognized in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut,15 where the Supreme Court invalidated a Connecticut statute
making possession and use of contraceptives by married couples a
criminal offense.16 In Griswold, the marital relationship was held to
be within the "zone of privacy created by several fundamental consti-
tutional guarantees."17 The Court found the constitutional basis for a
right to privacy to be within the "penumbras" of the Bill of Rights and
the fourteenth amendment.18
Procreative rights also have been found to fall within this "zone of
privacy." In Eisenstadt v. Baird,19 the Supreme Court was called upon
to judge the constitutionality of a statute which prohibited the distri-
bution of contraceptives to single adults by unauthorized persons.
Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan stated: "If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fun-
damentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget
a child."20
Subsequent cases have continued to address procreative rights
within the framework of the right to privacy.2 ' This fundamental
right of privacy in procreative choice has also been extended to mi-
nors. In Carey v. Population Services International,22 the Supreme
Court struck down a New York statute prohibiting the sale of contra-
ceptives to minors. Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan found
that the "right to privacy in connection with decisions affecting pro-
creation extends to minors as well as to adults."23
Although the Supreme Court has yet to find a specific right to ster-
ilization within the right to privacy context, several lower courts have
12. See infra notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
13. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
14. Bellotti v. Baird II, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976);
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
15. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
16. Id. at 485.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 484-85.
19. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
20. Id. at 453.
21. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
22. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
23. Id. at 693.
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since recognized the right to be sterilized.24 These courts have based
their holdings on the Supreme Court's recognition of a protected pri-
vacy interest in both obtaining contraceptives and choosing to termi-
nate a pregnancy.25 The right to be sterilized (as a matter of
procreative choice), or to resist sterilization has been discussed in
cases involving mentally retarded minors.26 This issue becomes prob-
lematic when a mentally retarded minor is believed incompetent to
exercise either of these rights. The tough question is, who, if anybody,
should make the choice to sterilize a mentally retarded minor? If that
choice is to be made, under what conditions should it be made?
III. REVIEW OF COURT DECISIONS
A. Cases Denying Authorization
The issue of sterilization of mentally retarded minors typically
reaches the court by way of petition. Often a parent, guardian, or the
superintendent of, an institution will petition a court to authorize the
sterilization of a mentally retarded minor. Courts have denied such
petitions for one or more of the following reasons: (1) lack of jurisdic-
tion (either statutory or common law); (2) no applicable common-law
family relationship that would allow the parent to have the child ster-
ilized; and (3) fear of judicial liability. The central controversy is
whether, pursuant to their general authority but without statutory au-
thority, courts with jurisdiction over incompetent persons may order
sterilization.
1. Lack of Jurisdiction
Most of the early cases held that, absent specific legislative author-
ity, the court was not the proper forum for authorizing sterilization.27
24. Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361 (Conn. 1981); North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp. 451 (N.C. 1976); In re Tulley, 83 Cal.
App. 698, 146 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 967 (1979); In re M.K.R.,
515 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1974); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981); In re
A.D., 394 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1977), affd, In re D.D., 64 A.D.2d 898, 408 N.Y.S.2d 104
(1978); In re Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 307 N.W.2d 881 (1981).
25. See supra note 21. See also Murphy, A Constitutional Right to Sterilization:
Ponter v. Ponter, 7 CAP. U.L. REV. 117 (1977). But see Hathaway v. Worcester City
Hosp., 475 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1973)(policy of refusing use of hospital facilities for
consensual sterilization violative of the equal protection clause); Ponter v.
Ponter, 135 N.J. 50, 342 A.2d 574 (1975) (married woman's right to be sterilized
without consent of husband).
26. See supra notes 21-22. The fact that these issues have arisen primarily in cases
involving either mentally retarded persons or minors attests in part to their vul-
nerability as a class.
27. See, e.g., Wade v. Bethesda, 337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio 1971); Hudson v. Hudson,
373 So. 2d 310 (Ala. 1979)(inherent equity power of the circuit court over both
incompetents and minors did not include the power to order a surgical steriliza-
[Vol. 68:410
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Although a court of general jurisdiction has the power to adjudicate
all controversies at law and equity within the legal bounds of rights
and remedies, this was held not to include authorizing sterilization. In
addition, courts of limited jurisdiction such as probate,28 surrogate,29
and juvenile courts,3 0 were also found to lack the necessary jurisdic-
tion, and thus authority, to provide the relief requested. Therefore, in
states where no specific statutory authority is granted to courts, no
forum exists for authorizing the sterilization of a 'mentally retarded
minor.
While some state statutes grant courts such authority, this legisla-
tion often applies only to residents of state institutions for the men-
tally retarded.31 The existence of these statutes has been interpreted
by courts as indicating that the legislature is the proper forum for or-
dering sterilization.32
Equal protection issues have been raised when statutes limit the
availability of sterilization to residents of institutions.33 If a state al-
lows the sterilization of an institutionalized mentally retarded resi-
dent, then not allowing similar procedures for noninstitutionalized
residents violates their rights based on the equal protection clause of
the foufteenth amendment.34 This argument has had limited impact
tioh); In re Tulley, 83 Cal. App. 698, 146 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1978), cerL denied, 440
U.. 967 (1979); In re Kemp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 758, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1974); In re
S.C.E., 378 A.2d 144 (Del. 1977); Holmes v. Powers, 439 S.W.2d 579 (Ky.
19d8)(court denied county health officer and local medical society's petition to
sterilize defendant); In re M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1974)(jurisdiction of juve-
nilb court to order or authorize sterilization of a child may be conferred only by
spdcific statute); In re A.D., 90 Misc. 2d 236, 394 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1977), affd, In re
D.D., 64 A.D. 2d 898,408 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1978); Frazier v. Levi, 440 S.W.2d 393 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1969) ("[a]ny order authorizing... [sterilization] would be in excess of
the power delegated by the statutes of Texas and would be invalid." Id. at 395.).
But see In re Matejski, 419 N.W.2d 576 (Iowa 1988), and In re Sallamaier, 85 Misc.
2d. 295, 378 N.Y.S.2d 989 (1976)(early cases finding authority within general eq-
uity powers to order sterilization); In re Simpson, 180 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio Probate
1962).
28. In re Kemp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 758, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1974) (probate court has no
other powers other than those given by statute).
29. In re A.D., 90 Misc. 2d 236, 394 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1977), affd, In re D.D., 64 A.D.2d
898, 408 N.Y.S.2d 104 (App. Div. 1978) (surrogate court lacks authority to entertain
petition seeking authorization for sterilization).
30. "n re M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1974)(jurisdiction of juvenile court to order or
authorize sterilization of a child may be conferred only by specific statute).
31. See infra notes 81-89 and accompanying text.
32. Smith v. Command, 231 Mich. 409,204 N.W. 140 (1925); In re Johnson Tempie, 263
S.E.2d 805 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980).
33. See, e.g., Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361 (D. Conn. 1981).
34. Such an argument was advanced in Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361 (D. Conn.
1981). The court, although declining to rewrite the law, enjoined the defendants
"from refusing to provide the plaintiffs with services identical to those provided
to inmates of [other institutions] to enable them to obtain consent of a probate
court to the sterilization operations upon them.".Id. at 371-72.
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on subsequent decisions.
2. No "Family Relationship" Justification
In addition to denying requests for sterilization based on lack of
jurisdiction, courts have also found unpersuasive "family relationship"
arguments grounded in common law. In A.L. v. G.R.H.,35 a mother
filed a complaint seeking a declaration of her right under the
common-law attributes of the parent-child relationship to have her
mentally retarded son sterilized. The district court denied her re-
quest.3 6 The appellate court affirmed, declaring its belief that "the
common law does not invest parents with such power over their chil-
dren even though they sincerely believe the child's adulthood would
benefit therefrom."3 7
Following A.L. v. G.R.H., an Indiana court of appeals held that the
district trial court erred when it denied a child's petition for an injunc-
tion not to be sterilized.38 The appellate court then granted the in-
junction.39 Although not on appeal, the appellate court noted that the
trial court had subsequently denied the parent's petition for authority
to sterilize on the grounds that the denial of the injunction was res
judicata to that issue.40 The appellate court found this reasoning to be
flawed:
Determination of the child's right to an injunction in the absence of prior judi-
cial authorization does not of itself preclude a future determination that steril-
ization is in the best interest of the child. In such instance and upon proper
petition, a court of competent jurisdiction might authorize sterilization. That
the parties and the trial court may have assumed that denial of the injunction
carried with it an affirmative judicial authorization of the sterilization is
irrelevant. 4
1
On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court vacated the judgment, af-
firmed the judgment of the trial court, and held that juvenile courts
have jurisdiction over such sterilization matters.42 The court noted
that in denying the parents a forum to raise the question of steriliza-
tion, the trial court had, in effect, made the constitutional choice for
35. 163 Ind. App. 636, 325 N.E.2d 501 (1975), cert denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976). See also
Hudson v. Hudson, 373 So. 2d 310 (Ala. 1979) (parents cannot be authorized to act
on behalf of their mentally incompetent minor child absent a finding that failure
to authorize sterilization will endanger the incompetent's life or health).
36. A.L. v. G.R.H., 163 Ind. App. 636, 325 N.E.2d 501 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936
(1976).
37. Id. at 638, 325 N.E.2d at 502.
38. In re P.S., 443 N.E.2d 67 (Ind. App. 1982), vacated, 452 N.E.2d 969 (Ind. 1983).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 69 n.1.
41. Id. at 73 n.4.
42. In re P.S., 452 N.E.2d 969, 976 (Ind. 1983). For a discussion on the proper court to
entertain petitions in Indiana see Note, Exclusive Juvenile Jurisdiction to Au-
thorize Sterilization of Incompetent Minors, 16 IND. L. REV. 835 (1983).
[Vol. 68:410
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the minor (that the minor should not be sterilized).43
3. Judicial Liability
Because of the lack of specific statutory or common-law authority,
fear of liability also may have influenced courts not to grant orders
authorizing sterilization. In Wade v. Bethesda Hospital," the United
States District Court explicitly held that a state probate judge who
had ordered a sterilization was not protected by the doctrine of judi-
cial immunity as "there was no set of circumstances or conditions
under Ohio law which would permit defendant Gary to order plaintiff
to submit to sterilization."45
The issue of liability arose again in Sparkman v. McFarlin,46 where
the Seventh Circuit ruled that a judge who had ordered the steriliza-
tion of a fifteen-year-old woman was not immune from liability for
damages resulting from his action. The court held that "[t]here are
actions of purported judicial character that a judge, even when exer-
cising general jurisdiction, is not empowered to take."47 The court
noted that there was no statutory or common-law authority to support
the sterilization order.48 The court also relied on the fact that the In-
diana Legislature had enacted a statute outlining the procedures
whereby an institutionalized mentally retarded person could be ster-
ilized as evidence negating the judge's right to assert jurisdiction over
a petition to authorize sterilization of a noninstitutionalized person.49
This decision set some precedent and influenced at least one judge to
deny a petition to authorize sterilization on the explicit ground of fear
of liability.50
With this background, the Supreme Court heard Sparkman on ap-
peal.51 In a 5-3 decision,2 the Court held that: (1) there was not a
clear absence of all jurisdiction in the circuit court to consider the ster-
43. In re P.S., 452 N.E.2d 969, 976 (Ind. 1983).
44. 337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
45. Id. at 674. For a related case finding that immunity did not apply to a guardian,
but may have applied to state social workers, see Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1
(Ist Cir. 1978). See also Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361 (D. Conn. 1981)(hospital
refused to sterilize because of fear of future liability); In re Penny N., 414 A.2d
541 (N.H. 1980)(doctor refused to operate without court approval).
46. 552 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd sub non. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349
(1978).
47. Id. at 176.
48. Id. at 175.
49. Id. The statute provided for the right to notice and an opportunity to defend, as
well as the right to appeal. Id.
50. In re S.C.E., 378 A.2d 144 (Del. Ch. 1977).
51. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
52. Id. White delivered the opinion. Burger, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Stevens
joined. Stewart dissented, in which Marshall and Powell joined. Powell also filed
a dissenting opinion. Brennan took no part in the decision.
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ilization petition;53 and (2) the judge had immunity.54 The Court rea-
soned that neither the lack of precedent nor the absence of specific
statutory authority excluded the possibility of granting relief.
[I]n our view, it is more significant that there was no Indiana statute and no
case law in 1971 prohibiting a circuit court, a court of general jurisdiction,
from considering a petition of the type presented to [the judge]. The statutory
authority for the sterilization of institutionalized persons in the custody of the
State does not warrant the inference that a court of general jurisdiction has no
power to act on a petition for sterilization of a minor in the custody of her
parents, particularly where the parents have authority under the Indiana stat-
utes to "consent to and contract for medical or hospital care or treatment of
[the minor] including surgery."5 5
B. Cases Granting Authority
After the Supreme Court decision in Stump, the threshold ques-
tion of jurisdiction no longer prevented courts from deciding the issue
of authorizing orders to sterilize mentally retarded minors. Indeed,
Stump has been interpreted to stand directly for the proposition that
state courts now have the power to issue orders authorizing steriliza-
tion.56 Along with the precedential authority of Stump, courts have
also based jurisdiction to authorize sterilization on the power of
53. Id. at 358.
54. Id. at 364.
55. Id. at 358, quoting IND. CODE § 16-8-4-2 (1973). For discussion on the influence of
this case on the doctrine of judicial immunity see Block, Stump v. Sparkman and
the History of Judicial Immunity, DUKE L. J. 879 (1980); Note, Judicial Immu-
nity, 11 IND. L. REV. 489 (1978).
56. "Persuasive authority for the principle that courts of general jurisdiction do have
jurisdiction over a petition by a parent or guardian for an order authorizing steril-
ization is found in the United States Supreme Court opinion in Stump v. Spark-
man." In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 228, 230, 608 P.2d 635, 637 (1980).
Consequently, it appears that neither by statute nor case law has the
jurisdiction granted to the courts of common pleas, in particular the or-
phans' court division, been circumscribed to foreclose consideration of a
petition seeking authorization for guardian to consent to an incompe-
tent's sterilization.
In re Terwilliger, 450 A.2d 1376, 1380 (Pa. Super. 1982).
But see In re Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 307 N.W.2d 881 (1981). In contrast,
the court recognized jurisdiction but refused to exercise it, forbidding lower
courts from also exercising jurisdiction. Restraint was most appropriate because
the state's interest was in affording the most protection to the mentally retarded.
Id. at 575, 307 N.W.2d at 897. The proper forum for making policy was the legisla-
ture. They are better able to give an in-depth study to the entire problem and to
seek expert testimony. Id. at 570, 307 N.W.2d at 895. Incompetents must "be con-
sidered, for the purpose of sterilization, a distinct class to whom the state owes a
special concern." Id. at 574, 307 N.W.2d at 897. In In re Matejski, 419 N.W.2d 576
(Iowa 1988), the court concluded "that district courts possess subject matter juris-
diction over, and accordingly may hear and determine, applications seeking au-
thorization for sterilization of a mentally incapacitated ward, such as that
involved here." Id. at 580. The court noted that consideration of the constitu-
tional rights at stake was not relevant to the question of jurisdiction. "Our law is
[Vol. 68:410
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parens patriae.5 7 Other bases for jurisdiction include precedent re-
quiring judicial approval for extraordinary medical treatment and the
jurisdictional authority contained in some state constitutions.
1. Parens Patriae
An influential post-Stump case involved Lee Ann Grady, a
nineteen-year-old with Downs Syndrome who had no significant un-
derstanding of her sexuality and would not be able to take care of a
baby alone. Her parents believed that contraception through steriliza-
tion was an appropriate precaution, given the circumstances of their
daughter's life. The hospital refused to perform the sterilization and
the parents requested authorization from the Superior Court, Chan-
cery Division of New Jersey.58
Afteir first identifying the opposing constitutional rights at stake
(the right to obtain sterilization and the right to be free from involun-
tary stgrilization), and finding no applicable state statutes, the judge
held that the power to authorize substituted consent for sterilization
was inherent in the parens patriae jurisdiction of the chancery
court.5 9
On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the lower
court's reliance on parens patriae.6 o The Grady court noted that
"[t]he parens patriae power of our courts derives from the inherent
equitable authority of the sovereign to protect those persons within
the state who cannot protect themselves because of an innate legal
disabiliy."61 The court then analogized other instances in which the
power of parens patriae has been invoked: to protect personal rights,
to protect the best interests of children in custody disputes, and in
cases involving substituted consent for medical proceedings. Subse-
quent cases have primarily relied on the power of parens patriae as
jurisdictional grounds for authorizing sterilization.62
clear that the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is an abstract inquiry unrelated
and precedent to the rights of the parties to a particular case." Id. at 579.
57. Parens patriae literally means parent of the country. The term refers to the
state, as sovereign, in its role as guardian. Parens patriae originated in English
common law when the King acted as guardian to persons with legal disabilities
such as infants, idiots, and lunatics. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed.
1979). For a discussion of the origin and nature of parens patriae, see Note, Civil
Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1190, 1207-10 (1974).
58. In re Grady, 170 N.J. Super. 98, 101, 405 A.2d 851, 852 (N.J. Ch. 1979).
59. Id. at 122, 405 A.2d at 863.
60. In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981).
61. Id. at 259, 426 A.2d at 479.
62. See, e.g., In re Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 432 N.E.2d 712 (1982). The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts was specifically called upon to answer the question of
whether "the probate and family court, absent specific statutory authority, could
order the sterilization of an adult mentally retarded female." Id. at 556-57, 432
N.E.2d at 715. The court recognized that, absent any limiting legislation, the pro-
1989]
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2. Jurisdictional Authority Under the State Constitution
Another early post-Stump case to impact later decisions was de-
cided by the Washington Supreme Court in In re Hayes.6 3 The court
claimed authority under their state constitution to act on a petition for
an order to authorize sterilization of a severely retarded minor:
Original jurisdiction is granted to superior courts over all cases and proceed-
ings in which jurisdiction is not vested exclusively in some other court by
Washington Const. art. 4, Sec. 6. Under this broad grant of jurisdiction the
superior court may entertain and act upon a petition from the parent or guard-
ian of a mentally incompetent person for a medical procedure as sterilization.
No statutory authorization is required.
6 4
3. Judicial Approval Requirement
A third line of reasoning used by the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court to support a finding of jurisdiction was based on earlier
cases involving the approval of medical decisions made on behalf of
wards by guardians. In In re Moe,65 the court relied on previous cases
which had established that judicial approval was required before a
guardian could consent to administering or withholding proposed ex-
traordinary medical treatment: "Since sterilization is an extraordi-
nary and highly intrusive form of medical treatment that irreversibly
extinguishes the ward's fundamental right of procreative choice, we
conclude that a guardian must obtain a proper judicial order."66
C. Standards
Having resolved the thorny problem of jurisdiction, the next step
bate court had plenary power to exercise its jurisdiction to provide for the needs
of the mentally incompetent person. Id. at 563, 432 N.E.2d at 719. Similarly, a
Pennsylvania court held that an orphans' court's inherent parens patriae jurisdic-
tion applied to a petition for the sterilization of an incompetent. In re Terwil-
liger, 450 A.2d 1376 (Pa. Super. 1982). See also In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607 (Alaska
1981)(inherent parens patriae authority of a court with general jurisdiction em-
powers that court to order sterilization of incompetent); Wentzel v. Montgomery
Gen. Hosp., Inc., 293 Md. 685, 447 A.2d 1244 (1982)(circuit court has inherent equi-
table jurisdiction to hear guardian's petition based on parens patriae); In re
Penny, 120 N.H. 269, 414 A.2d 541 (1980); In re Nilsson, 122 Misc. 2d 458, 471
N.Y.S.2d 439 (Sup. Ct. 1983); Brode v. Brode, 278 S.C. 457, 298 S.E.2d 443
(1982)(family court had jurisdiction over parents' petition for judgment permit-
ting sterilization of their mentally retarded handicapped daughter by statute
granting exclusive original jurisdiction to family courts in matters concerning any
child whose "behavior" or "condition" could "injure or endanger his welfare." Id.
at 459, 298 S.E.2d at 444). But see Anonymous v. Anonymous, 469 So. 2d 588 (Ala.
1985) (Supreme Court of Alabama, relying on Hudson v. Hudson, 373 So. 2d 310
(Ala. 1979), as precedent for denying jurisdictional authority to grant petition).
63. 93 Wash. 2d 228, 608 P.2d 635 (1980).
64. Id. at 232, 608 P.2d at 638.
65. 385 Mass. 555, 432 N.E.2d 712 (1982).
66. Id. at 559, 432 N.E.2d at 717.
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was to determine the conditions under which an order would be
granted. The result is best understood as a two-step process. First, the
court articulates the legal underpinnings which necessitate the stan-
dards. The two rationales forwarded thus far include a "best inter-
ests" approach and reliance on the doctrine of "substituted judgment."
Although some commentators prefer the "substituted judgment stan-
dard" over the "best interests standard,"67 there is little difference in
the procedures courts ultimately adopt to safeguard the constitutional
rights at issue.68 In both instances, the court makes the final decision
as to whether sterilization is to take place.
The second phase is to identify the specific procedures used in de-
termining whether sterilization is to occur. The procedures adopted
by courts vary in both the factors to be considered and how the stan-
dard of proof is applied. Two post-Stump cases have been influential
in resolving the dilemma of how to best serve a mentally retarded mi-
nor who cannot exercise the constitutional right either to obtain or
resist sterilization.
The Hayes court adopted the "best interest" standard. The court
deemed necessary the appointment of a guardian ad litem to present
the person to be sterilized because "the interests of the parents of a
retarded person cannot be presumed to be identical to those of the
child."69 The court further declared that the standard "will be to
show by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that such a procedure is
in the best interest of the retarded person."70 The court then identi-
fied the factors to be considered while making an assessment, that ster-
ilization is in the best interest of the mentally retarded person. The
factors include:
(1) the age and educability of the individual;
(2) the individual's potential as a parent;
(3) whether the individual is incapable of making a decision regarding his or
her sterilization;
(4) whether the individual is physically capable of procreation;
(5) the likelihood that the individual will engage in sexual activity now or in
the future;
(6) whether less drastic means of contraception have proven unworkable; and
(7) whether, in the near future, scientific and medical knowledge is likely to
produce either a less drastic method of contraception, or an advance in the
treatment of the individual's disability. 7 1
By setting up strict guidelines, the majority intended to protect the
rights of those faced with potential sterilization, particularly children.
67. See, e.g., Comment, Protection of the Mentally Retarded Individual's Right To
Choose Sterilization: The Effect of the Clear and Convincifig Standard, 12 CAP.
U.L. REv. 413, 416 (1983).
68. See notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
69. In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 228, 236, 608 P.2d 635, 640 (1980).
70. Id. at 237, 608 P.2d at 640.
71. Id. at 237-39, 608 P.2d at 640-41.
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This burden will be even harder to overcome in the case of an incompetent
minor, whose youth may make it difficult or impossible to prove by clear, co-
gent and convincing evidence that he or she will never be capable of making
an informed judgment about sterilization or of caring for a child.7 2
"Impossible" may well be the most apt description of this standard.
Proponents for the sterilization are challenged to prove that the minor
will never be capable of making an informed judgment, a feat that
may prove philosophically impossible. In addition, it is unclear how
effective independent evaluators may be in determining these fac-
tors.73 Nevertheless, the rigorous procedures necessary to prove that
it is in the best interest of a person to be sterilized provides a barrier
for those who may be seeking the sterilization with improper motives.
In contrast, the underlying rationale for the standards outlined in
Grady was based on the doctrine of "substitute judgment." The court
reasoned:
We believe that having the choice made in her behalf produces a more just
and compassionate result than leaving Lee Ann with no way of exercising a
constitutional right. Our Court should accept the responsibility of providing
her with a choice to compensate for her inability to exercise personally an
important constitutional right.
7 4
This "substitute judgment" was borrowed from the famous Karen
Ann Quinlan case.75 The court, in substituting its judgment for that of
an incompetent, allows a constitutional choice to be made, in this case,
the choice to become sterilized. The standards and procedures pro-
nounced in Grady relied heavily on those set out in Hayes, albeit with
some differences. The Grady standards are as follows:
(1) the individual is incapable of making a decision;
(2) the individual is unlikely to develop the capacity to make an informed
judgment in the foreseeable future;
(3) the individual is likely to be sexually active or exposed to situations where
she is forced to submit to sexual intercourse;
(4) she is likely to be permanently unable to understand reproduction or
contraception;
(5) less drastic methods of birth control are not feasible;
(6) sterilization is advisable at this time, as opposed to a future date;
(7) a scientific breakthrough may occur to improve the disability or the nature
of the sterilization;
(8) the individual lacks the ability to care for a child or the possibility of a
spouse caring for a child; and
72. Id. at 239, 608 P.2d at 641.
73. Melton & Scott, Evaluation of Mentally Retarded Persons for Sterilization: Con-
tributions and Limits of Psychological Consultation, 15 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY: REs.
AND PRAC. 34 (1984). Professionals who make these assessments are advised to be
cognizant of the limitations of their expertise in assisting the fact finder. "Partic-
ularly in view of the gaps in knowledge described here, psychologists should be
careful not to cross from 'specialized knowledge' into common sense judgments
within the purview of the legal fact finder." Id.
74. In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 261, 426 A.2d 467, 481 (1981).
75. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
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(9) those requesting the operation are not seeking it for their own or the pub-
lic's convenience.
76
There are some practical differences in how these two procedures
compare. In Hayes, the proponent must prove by clear and convincing
evidence each of the factors identified. In Grady, the standard of
proof (clear and convincing evidence) is applied to the issue of
whether sterilization is in the best interests of the incompetent, not to
the specific factors used in that determination. 77 Subsequent cases
have followed both the rationale for jurisdiction and the procedures
for authorizing a petition for sterilization set down in Grady.78 Three
other courts have modified the Grady and Hayes procedures in deter-
mining when and how the decision to sterilize should be made.79 One
major difference in subsequent decisions has been the requirement of
showing that sterilization is medically necessary.8 0
76. In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 266, 426 A.2d 467, 483 (1981).
77. Wlle Hayes demands that the proponent prove by clear and convincing evidence
that "the current state of scientific and medical knowledge does not suggest
either: (a) that a reversible sterilization procedure or other less drastic contra-
ceotive method will shortly be available, or (b) that science is on the threshold of
an advance in the treatment of te individual's disability," In re Hayes, 93 Wash.
229, 239, 608 P.2d 635, 641 (198P), the Grady court considers the latter as only a
factor to be considered. Thus, the necessity of proving a negative is overcome.
78. Sei supra note 32.
79. The Alaska Supreme Court held that the best interests of the incompetent had to
be proved by clear and convincing evidence. The court set criteria that the indi-
vidual: (1) cannot make a decision about sterilization; (2) is capable of reproduc-
tioh; (3) could not adequately care for a child; (4) cannot use other methods of
contraception; and (5) there is no less restrictive alternative. Finally, the court
must determine whether the request reflects interests other than those of the
mentally retarded individual. In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607, 613 (Alaska 1981).
The Colorado Supreme Court held that a court must first determine whether
the individual is capable of reproduction and unlikely to improve in ability to
make an informed decision. Without specifically mandating the clear and con-
vincing evidence standard for these factors, the court did reiterate the concern of
the Hayes court that the mentally retarded youth might never be able to prove
incapacity to consent using the clear and convincing evidence standard. The ma-
jor difference, however, was that the court must find by clear and convincing
evidence that sterilization is medically essential. In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366, 375
(Colo. 1981).
The Maryland Supreme Court also used the clear and convincing standard to
show that sterilization was in the best interests of the incompetent. The factors
included a determination that the individual is capable of reproduction. The
court must examine the availability of alternative and less intrusive methods of
birth control or sterilization procedures. The age of the individual and the possi-
bility of future scientific advances that would improve the mental condition also
must be considered. Again, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence
that sterilization is medically necessary to preserve the life or physical or mental
health of the incompetent. Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. Hosp., Inc., 293 Md. 685,
447 A.2d 1244 (1982).
80. See supra note 79.
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IV. REVIEW OF STATE LEGISLATION
Because procreative decisions implicate fundamental rights, any
limitation on the right to make such decisions must be narrowly
drawn and further a compelling state interest. Previous state justifi-
cations for sterilization are no longer valid. The notion that steriliza-
tion is necessary for mentally retarded persons so that they will not be
able to reproduce offspring with similar characteristics has been thor-
oughly discredited.S1 Similarly, sterilization as a means of punish-
ment is no longer condoned.8 2 The most common current rationale
for legislation governing sterilization legislation parallels the "best in-
terest" standard found in case law.8 3
The American Bar Foundation recently undertook a search of state
statutes governing the sterilization of the mentally retarded.8 4
Twenty-six states were found to have laws which authorize steriliza-
tion of mentally disabled persons, the majority of which also apply to
the developmentally disabled.8 5 The statutes vary widely in their pro-
tection of mentally retarded minors' rights. Some statutes contain
provisions which entirely exclude minors. 86
The most important feature of many of the statutes is the proce-
dural protections afforded those confronted with the prospect of ster-
ilization. Many statutes contain provisions for both prehearing and
posthearing procedures. The majority of statutes require that notice
of the application of sterilization be given to concerned parties. 8 7 The
purpose served by the notice requirement is weakened, however,
when not followed by a mandatory hearing.8 8 Several states addition-
ally require either the appointment of an attorney or guardian ad li-
tem to assist in the proceedings.8 9
In reviewing the statutory legislation designed to regulate the con-
ditions upon which sterilization is to occur, the following recommen-
dations are proposed. These suggestions are taken from provisions of
several statutes and include both a prehearing and posthearing phase.
81. For an interesting chronological account of the rise and fall of the eugenics move-
ment see Cynkar, Buck v. BelL "Felt Necessities" vs. "Fundamental Values," 81
COLUM. L. REV. 1418 (1981).
82. See O'Hara & Sanks, Eugenic Sterilization, 45 GEO. L.J. 20 (1956). California,
Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, and Wisconsin for-
merly provided for compulsory sterilization of "hereditary criminals." Id.
83. S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW
(1985).
84. See id.
85. Id. at 523-24.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 525.
89. Id.
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The specific provisions listed below comprise the most stringent of the
current provisions.
A. Prehearing Procedures
The statute should cover as many people as is practical to eliminate
possible confusion and insure an available forum for those who choose
sterilization. Both institutionalized and noninstitutionalized, as well
as physically and mentally disabled persons should be covered. No age
requirement is recommended because the necessity of the sterilization
will be determined on a case-by-case basis. Naturally, it would be very
difficult to argue for the sterilization of an eight-year-old child.
The application for sterilization should be allowed to be made by
any interested party. This would include specifically authorizing the
superintendent of an institution, a parent, guardian, or the individual
desiring sterilization to make application for sterilization. A broad
provision allows an opportunity for the person to be sterilized as well
as makes explicit those responsible for initiating procedures if they
want a kerson sterilized. A determination must first be made that the
person is incapable of consent. If this is found, then a requirement of
notice izhust be given to the relevant parties twenty days before a hear-
ing date is set.
B. HeAring and Posthearing Procedures
Couhisel should be required at all stages of the proceedings. The
presence of the person to be sterilized should be mandatory at the
hearing. The rationale for sterilization should be that it is in the best
interests of the individual. The factors to be used in that determina-
tion should be those elaborated in Hayes, including the clear and con-
vincing standard of proof. Finally, there should be a waiting period of
thirty days in case of appeal.
V. THE STATE OF LAW IN NEBRASKA
A. Legislation in Nebraska
There is currently no legislation in Nebraska governing the sterili-
zation of mentally retarded minors. The most recent applicable stat-
utes were repealed in 1969. In the previous fifty-four years, however,
Nebraska had statutes governing sterilization. As early as 1915, the
first legislation addressing the sterilization of the "feeble-minded" and
"insane" was drafted.90 The first statutes provided that "no feeble-
minded or insane inmate of a state institution shall be discharged ca-
pable of bearing offspring."91 A board of examiners was required to
90. NEB. COMP. STAT., ch. 66, art. XV, §§ 7059-7062 (1922).
91. Id. at § 7059.
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examine all inmates for the appropriateness of the procedure. 92 As a
measure of concern, the operation was to be explained to the "inmate
and to the husband, wife, parent, guardian or nearest kin of such in-
mate."93 Further, "no such operation shall be performed without the
written consent of such husband, wife, parent, guardian, or nearest
kin, as the case may be, and assent of such inmate so far as said inmate
is capable of assenting thereto." 94
The sterilization statutes were altered in 1929.95 Procedural safe-
guards were implemented to include the requirement of notice, a
hearing, and a specific finding of necessity for the procedure as well as
the opportunity for appeal. 96 Additionally, upon order of the court
(considering board recommendations), any inmate convicted of rape,
incest, or any crime against nature, was to be castrated. As considera-
tion for the ordeal, the inmate became eligible to apply for a commuta-
tion of sentence within one year of the castration.97
The final changes in Nebraska sterilization legislation took place in
1957.98 The statutes were changed to apply only to inmates of Beatrice
State Hospital. The castration provision was repealed and the specific
procedural guidelines were modified slightly. An appeal from the
board could be taken to the district court and later to the Nebraska
Supreme Court. The entire statutory scheme covering sterilization
was repealed in 1969.99
B. Nebraska Case Law
The Nebraska Supreme Court's involvement with sterilization is-
sues has been relatively limited. The only significant cases to come
before the court concerned the constitutionality of Nebraska's now re-
pealed sterilization statutes. The first case to reach the supreme court
questioned the constitutionality of the Nebraska statute which condi-
tioned the release from a state institution upon sterilization.100 Re-
flecting the sanctioned views of the time, Judge Dean wrote:
[Tihe legislative act before us is in the interest of the public welfare in that its
prime objective is to prevent the procreation of mentally and physically ab-
normal human beings. We think it is within the police power of the state to
provide for the sterilization of feeble-minded persons as a condition prerequi-
92. Id. at §§ 7060-7061.
93. Id. at § 7062.
94. Id.
95. NEB. COMP. STAT., ch. 83, art. XV, §§ 83-1501 to -1510 (1929).
96. Id. at § 1505.
97. Id. at § 1504.
98. NEB. REV. STAT. §§.83-501 to -509 (1957).
99. 1969 Neb. Laws 574.
100. In re Clayton, 120 Neb. 680, 234 N.W. 630 (1931). See supra text accompanying
note 87 for a discussion of this statute.
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site to release from a state institution.1 0 1
In State v. Cavitt,10 2 the Nebraska Supreme Court was again called
upon to determine the constitutionality of a statute making steriliza-
tion a condition of parole or discharge.O3 In a 5-2 decision, the statute
was held constitutional. In summing up the opposing arguments,
Judge Carter stated:
The opposition to such a statute as we have before us is largely based on the
assumption that the operation is inhuman, unreasonable, and oppressive. The
surgical operation of vasectomy on mentally defective males and salpingec-
tomy on mentally defective females is a simple operation without pain or dis-
comfort to the patient. It does not reduce his sex impulses nor limit his
capacity to engage in sexual relations. It does no harm to the patient other
that to eliminate the capacity to procreate.
1 0 4
Although the Nebraska Supreme Court has not decided a case di-
rectly recognizing the right to be sterilized or the right to resist sterili-
zation, In re Burbanks and Rima gives an indication as to how the
court might rule.105 Burbanks involved the termination of parental
rights of an allegedly mentally retarded couple. The court noted in
dicta tl~at the director of Multi-County Social Service Unit 122 had
assiste4 in processing legal instruments executed by the allegedly
mentally retarded parents authorizing the mother to have an abortion
and be sterilized.106 The court concluded:
The abortion did take place. The director testified that the sterilization did
not. However, there is other evidence in the record that it may have taken
placbi. At what time and on whose initiative does not appear. The director
testified that [the mother] understood what she was signing.
We have searched the statutes to determine whether any welfare agency in
Nebraska is authorized to engage in such activities. We find none. The
Supreme Court of the United States has held that a woman does have a consti-
101. Id. at 684, 234 N.W. at 632.
102. 182 Neb. 712, 157 N.W.2d 171, reh'g denied, 183 Neb. 243, 159 N.W.2d 566 (1968),
appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 996 (1970).
103. Specifically, the provision called into question concerned a statute which read in
pertinent part:
It shall be the duty of the board of examiners to make a psychiatric and
physical examination of these patients and, if after a careful examina-
tion, such board of examiners finds that such patient is mentally defi-
cient, in the opinion of the board of examiners, is apparently capable of
bearing and begetting offspring and, based on their psychiatric and medi-
cal findings as a result of this examination, it is the opinion of the board
of examiners that such patient be made sterilized, as a condition prereq-
uisite to the parole or discharge, then such patient shall not be paroled or
discharged, as the case may be, unless said patient be made sterile, and
that such operation be performed for the prevention of procreation as in
the judgment of the board of examiners would be most appropriate to
each individual case.
Id. at 714, 157 N.W.2d at 174.
104. Id. at 721, 157 N.W.2d at 178.
105. In re Burbanks and Rima, 209 Neb. 676, 310 N.W.2d 138 (1981).
106. Id. at 702, 310 N.W.2d at 151.
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tutional right to an abortion. It would seem to follow that a woman also has a
concomitant right not to have the above-described procedures performed. 107
VI. CONCLUSION
Because of the repealed legislation on sterilization in Nebraska, an
argument could be made that the legislature is the proper forum for
outlining the procedures to determine the sterilization rights of men-
tally retarded minors. Even with legislation, however, it is ultimately
the courts that make the final determination of whether the steriliza-
tion will actually take place.10s Additionally, courts are called upon to
determine whether the statutes authorizing the procedures are
constitutional.1 0 9
Several advantages inhere in pushing for a judicial response. The
most obvious advantage is that of speed. A petition could either be
granted or denied far sooner than legislation could be enacted. Of the
courts in Nebraska, the proper court to petition for authorization of
sterilization would be the district court.110 The Nebraska court could
arguably rest its authority to consider sterilization petitions upon the
jurisdictional basis of parens patriae."1 1 Nebraska could further adopt
107. Id. The court cited Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), for support.
108. Many of the statutes directly refer the matter to the court. See e.g., In re Penny
N., 120 N.H. 269, 414 A.2d 541 (1980)(a New Hampshire statute provided that the
guardians, in this case the parents of incapacitated persons, "may give any neces-
sary consent or approval to enable the ward to receive medical... care," but "no
guardian may give consent for sterilization ... unless the procedure is first ap-
proved by order of the probate court." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:25 I(c)
(1983)).
109. In In re Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d 143, 707 P.2d 760, 219 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1985), the
California Supreme Court held that a statutory scheme denying developmentally
disabled persons the right to be sterilized was overbroad and violative of state and
federal guarantees of privacy and liberty. The statutes did not provide for the
option of choosing sterilization as a means of contraception. The court eventually
adopted the standards enunciated in Hayes. Id.
110. The district court in Nebraska has authority to "exercise general, original and
appellate jurisdiction in all matters, both civil and criminal, except where other-
wise provided." NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-302 (1985). It has been judicially recognized
that district courts are courts of equity. Rhoades v. Rhoades, 78 Neb. 495, 111
N.W. 122 (1907). The Nebraska Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction in
equity. NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-204 (1985). The Nebraska Supreme Court can, of
course, hear matters of equity upon review.
The county court has jurisdiction pursuant to NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-517 (Cum.
Supp. 1986). This court has "exclusive original jurisdiction of all matters relating
to guardianship or conservatorship of any person... [and e]xclusive original juris-
diction in all juvenile matters, except in counties which have established separate
juvenile courts .... Id. The preference of the district court stems from their
specifically recognized authority in equity. Similarly, juvenile courts retain juris-
diction over juveniles only when they fall within one of eight categories. NEB.
REV. STAT. § 43-247 (Cum. Supp. 1986) The possibility of a mentally retarded mi-
nor falling within one of these required categories is remote.
111. Thus far, the Nebraska Supreme Court has relied primarily on the doctrine of
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the standards outlined in Hayes in determining whether to grant the
parent or guardian of an incompetent minor the authority to consent
to the minor's sterilization. These standards are the most rigorous to
be proposed, insuring that the best interest of the minor is considered.
if the petition is denied, and subsequent appeals fail, then legislative
action is still an option. The strategy would then be to go before the
legislature with the judicial refusal to authorize a petition.
The ultimate question is which branch should formulate the rules
under which the determination to sterilize is made. The lack of a
structure to authorize sterilizations currently denies mentally re-
tarded minors the opportunity to exercise their constitutional rights.
Without either judicial or statutory guidelines, there is confusion as to
the conditions under which sterilization should occur. The result is
that mentally retarded minors are being sterilized for better or for
worse depending on the benevolence of their parents or guardians.
Constitutional rights should not hang on such fortuitous circum-
stances. It is time for a decision to be made in Nebraska about the
conditions under which sterilization should take place. Not deciding,
of course, is a decision in itself. This is currently the Nebraska deci-
sion and it must not be allowed to stand.
Mark A. Small '89
parens patriae in cases involving child custody. Such an extension would be ap-
propriate in the case of mentally retarded minors. See Copple v. Copple, 186 Neb.
696, 185 N.W.2d 846 (1971); In re Reed, 152 Neb. 819, 4a N.W.2d 161 (1950).
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